From Medieval Conciliarism to Early Modern Gallicanism
Since the Council of Constance (1414-1418), which helped to heal the Occidental Schism by displacing three popes, had issued the decrees Haec Sancta and Frequens, the authority of the Council over the pope had become a common theological issue. Nevertheless, it was unresolved how the relevant texts should be interpreted:
3 Should the superiority of a council over the pope be reserved to emergencies or should it be regarded as a truth of faith? At the Council of Basel (1431-1439) it became clear that there was no peace in sight between conciliarists and curialists. This council viewed the decrees of Constance as a doctrine of faith against the resistance of Pope Eugene IV (in Etsi non dubitemus, 1441). Soon the conciliarist bishops lost the support of the secular princes and enabled the papacy to gain an enormously important political victory. Despite the lost battle, the war still went on. Conciliarism was still taught at a number of leading universities, e.g., in Paris, Erfurt, Cologne, Krakow, and Vienna. German-speaking Catholic scholars in particular remembered the deeds of Constance with reverence, but also with vehemence. 4 The Reformation and the Catholic Reform after Trent transformed this movement but did not extinguish it. In France it took the shape of Gallicanism. With its masterthinkers Edmond Richer and Jacques Bossuet, the French ecclesiastics frightened and challenged the Roman Curia throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, since the oldest daughter of the Church officially considered herself as an independent national church in the Declaratio Cleri Gallicani (1682). The Declaratio restricted the influence of the pope to the spiritual realm and declared the secular princes exempt from ecclesiastical power. Moreover, the French clergy also claimed that the pope could only teach infallibly if his teachings were received universally.
5 Especially in the Holy Roman Empire, Bossuet's defense of Gallicanism was widely read and had an enduring influence on the author of the Febronius.
6
In the Empire, the tradition of Conciliarism also continued. A definite point of culmination in the seventeenth century is the Gravamina of the three Rhenish prince bishop electors (Cologne, Mainz, and Trier) in 1673, in which they asked the Emperor to continue to adhere to the 1448 Concordat of Vienna regarding the freedom of episcopal elections, tithes, and other ecclesiastical appointments.
7 Whereas in the seventeenth and the first half of the eighteenth centuries French theologians dominated the conciliarist and episcopalist "scene" (including Jansenism), 8 the focus of scholarly attention had since shifted to the Holy Roman Empire ever since canon lawyers there had adopted Zeger-Bernhard van Espen's (1646-1728) Jus ecclesiasticum (1700) as their main textbook and thus started to buttress German episcopalism theologically.
9 De statu Ecclesiae (1763) made its anonymous author, known to the public as Justinus Febronius Jurisconsultus, instantantly famous.
10

Justinus Febronius -De statu Ecclesiae
At the time of the publication of 29 Following a promotion within the consistory, Hontheim was appointed auxiliary bishop and general vicar in 1748.
In the same year, the canons of St. Simeon also elected him dean. As auxiliary bishop he was also vice-chancellor of the University of Trier, where he tried to implement a reform of the educational system against the ferocious resistance of the Jesuits. 30 In 1753 he even suggested replacing the intransigent Jesuits with Benedictine monks, who on the whole were very open to the ideas of a moderate Enlightenment. However, this could not be achieved until 1764.
31
Hontheim was also in charge of the French speaking parts of the diocese, where he encountered the practice of highly developed Gallicanism.
32
It is not surprising that Clement Wenzeslaus, who was doctrinally an orthodox Catholic, protected Hontheim and disappointed the Roman Curia, which had hoped for a political change when the old archbishop died in 1768. Clement Wenzeslaus was a grandson of Emperor Joseph I and as such had good relations with the court in Vienna. Maria Theresia, however, urged him to continue to support Hontheim. 33 The archbishop changed his mind only because he was eager to obtain the rich abbey of Mettlach, which the Curia promised him in exchange for censoring the loathed author of the Febronius. Nevertheless, it was also Hontheim himself who contributed to his fall, when he backed the Enlightenment theologian Isenbiehl. However, it was not until spring 1779, one year after his famous retraction (see below) that the old auxiliary bishop's resignation was accepted. Hontheim retired to his castle Montquintin in Luxemburg, where he died on 2 September 1790.
34
The Background of De statu Ecclesiae
The main theses of De statu Ecclesiae probably go back to 1742, when the electors and their delegates disputed article 14 of the election treaty that they had requested from the designated Emperor Charles VII. Since Charles V, 1519, this article had been binding the emperors to the Vienna Concordat of 1448, in which the head of state promised the bishops his protection against papal punishments as well as interference in their dioceses by the nuncios. Hontheim and his friend Jakob Georg von Spangenberg (1695-1779), a convert from Protestantism, being delegates for the elector of Trier, even suggested at this event to deny all papal jurisdiction for dioceses in the Holy Roman Empire.
35 Already at this point, Hontheim rejected the defense of a monarchical power of the papacy, such as that provided by St. Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621), Guiseppe Agostino Orsi (1692-1761), Prospero Fagnani (1588-1678), and Benedict XIV (1740-1758). Furthermore, the election treaty gave him the opportunity to study the history of Conciliarism and the so called "liberties of the German Church" in more detail.
36 Nevertheless, one must not underestimate the personal influence of Spangenberg and the elector himself, Franz Georg von Schönborn (1729-1756), on Hontheim's episcopalist system. 
The main idea of De statu Ecclesiae
Like so many other works of the time, De statu Ecclesiae was influenced by a number of what Jonathan Israel calls conservative Enlightenment ideals, e.g., peaceful ecumenical dialogue, decentralized church government, and relative freedom of expression. Nevertheless Hontheim's book also stood in the tradition of Tridentine Reform Catholicism, which aimed at better pastoral care, simpler and less ostentatious piety, clear theological doctrines, etc. This could also be a description of the phenomenon of the Catholic Enlightenment.
41 However, the book also paid its tribute to the conciliarist tradition of the Middle Ages. Thus, one can truly call Hontheim's work a "marriage" between "conservative" (J. Israel) Enlightenment thought (heavily influenced by Jansenism) and conciliarism. 38) Schneider, Der Konziliarismus (see above, n. 4), p. 71; Spehr, Aufklärung und Ökumene (see above, n. 16), p. 38. Cf. Duchon, 'De Bossuet' (see above, n. 6); Sieben, Die katholische Konzilsidee (see above, n. 9), p. 433. 39) Stattler wrote extensively in the following years on the primacy of the pope and was finally censored by the Roman Curia. The works of Amort and Gerbert were never suppressed. 40) Pitzer, Justinus Febronius (see above, n. 16), pp. 97-110. 41) Raab, Die Concordata (see above, n. 14), p. 125 affirms that this stream of thought, which tried to bring about reforms in the Church, was in its essence not rationalist but rather influenced by Enlightenment ideals and the spirit of Trent.
Febronius idealized the first eight centuries of the church (ecclesia primitiva) -very much as Jansenism 42 did -as the true and normative Christendom, and the later developments, especially of the papacy, as a decline and perversion. Such a rigid view of history which excludes from the beginning any doctrinal or organizational development, was not only a common feature of eighteenthcentury scholastic theology 43 but also of the Catholic Enlightenment. 44 The Josephinist university reform in particular favored the expansion of church history as a discipline, not because of a sudden interest in history, but because it could legitimize the ecclesiastical policy that was exercised by the state. The reforms of Joseph II pretended to restore the true, pope-free Catholicism of the early patristic era.
45
42) It has not yet been investigated to what extent Hontheim followed Jansenist thought. Certainly he flirted with Jansenism, but we lack primary sources to connect him firmly with this current of thought. However, one can surely call him a sympathizer with parts of Jansenist ecclesiology and theology. This is evidenced by his loathing of scholasticism: 
The content of De statu Ecclesiae -an overview
Hontheim was not a clever innovator. Despite the fame his book received, it did not really say anything new and did not propose a new thesis. However, it brought the century old critique of the papacy into a "coherent and pragmatic system."
46 Moreover, it did not start out with a philosophical foundation, but by stating a fact: the influence of secular princes on ecclesiastical affairs. For the author of De statu Ecclesiae the state was the primary guardian of the church's constitution, since it was -like the Church 47 -instituted by God himself.
48 Therefore, Hontheim tried to convince the secular princes to use their influence to win back lost liberties that were usurped by the Curia. 49 In the same manner, the French 50 and later also the Austrian Jansenists sought the support of the civil authorities, but finally handed over the Church to a limitless governmental influence.
51
Febronius's concern is nevertheless a theological one: In the four prefaces (to Pope Clement XIII, the Christian kings and noblemen, the bishops, and the theologians/canonists) Hontheim elucidates that the office of bishop was of divine law and therefore unrestrictable by a human institution like the Curia. "The bishops are the true limits of the primacy."
52 To restore the ancient church order, the episcopal authority had to be reinstituted and the Curia had to be confronted with reports about her abuse of power as well as with the fact that her legitimization was based on forgeries. 53 The papacy could only keep what it entailed in the first centuries of Christianity. Everything else had to be regarded as redundant or harmful historical ballast.
54 Hontheim even went so far as to claim that a "reformed" Catholicism has to avoid the "extremes" of Protestantism, which includes the complete abandonment of a papal office, and Ultramontanism, an exaggeration of papal authority. Such a proposition was a declaration of war: The auxiliary bishop had charged the defenders of curialism as extremists and had dared to compare them with Protestant heretics. Consequently, canonists who were loyal to Rome declared the ecclesiology of De statu Ecclesiae as no longer within the boundaries of legitimate dissent. It was labeled heretical.
55 Hontheim, however, did not understand himself as an "innovator," but as a "restorer" or "reformer." The first edition with its nine chapters 56 was soon expanded to four volumes and only in 1777 was an abridged version, the Febronius abbreviatus, published.
57
The first part of De statu Ecclesiae (chapters 1 and 2) lays out Hontheim's considerations about the external way of governing the church and its 53) Pitzer 63 Although the preservation of ecclesiastical unity is the central task of the papacy, Hontheim's choice of words is very reserved. He tries to avoid a causal connection between the Church's unity and the necessity of the papal office, since for him the unity of the Church is the foundation of the primacy and not its consequence: "The Primacy [of the pope] has functional, but not constitutive importance for the Church."
64 Another papal responsibility is to be vindex canonum, securer of the deposit of faith. 65 However, this task also has to be considered subsidiary (jus supplendi). The pope also has the authority to decree provisional law, since it is impossible to convene a council often enough. Such law acquires universal validity only if all bishops, or at least a majority, agree with it.
66
Hontheim's emphasis on conceding to the papacy more than an honorary primacy is irreconcilable with his assertion that the pope is not summus episcopus, but only episcopus primae sedis. Thus, the bishops as successors of the apostles have an authority equal to that of the Bishop of Rome (omnes episcopi in episcopatu pares sunt). 67 In the college of bishops all are coimperantes, coregnantes ac conjudices. This is, however, not enough for the reformer of Trier: For him the succession of St. Peter is divine law, instituted by Christ; the content and mode (location and rights) of this succession, though, are human law.
69 Consequently, papal primacy is bound only by human law to the see of Rome and could be transferred to any other diocese.
70 This is the application of the Gallican axiom that the keys to the kingdom of God were not given to St. Peter, but to the whole Church (Matt. 16, 18 ).
71
The lengthy second part (chapters 3-7) analyzes the historical development of papal rights and privileges. In Hontheim's view, the early medieval Pseudoisidorian Decretals established a new ecclesiology that saw the pope as the Bishop of the Catholic Church and the diocesan bishops as his subordinated chaplains. This "perverted" system is, in the eyes of the Trier auxiliary bishop, one of the main reasons for the church division created by the Reformation. 
74
Especially important is chapter 6, in which the author again explains his concept of the papal office as service for the union of the church. Furthermore, he gives practical reasons along with historical ones as to why the college of bishops, when it is convened in a council, bears supreme jurisdiction over the church. 75 The main rationale for such a necessity is that the Curia has proved itself to be remarkably resistant to all attempted reforms for the good of the church.
76 A good example is that the decrees of Trent were not implemented until the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, for which, not the bishops, but the popes, are to be blamed. 77 Moreover, in order to retrieve the liberties of the local church, it is not enough that the bishops claim their rights, but that the laity be educated, and that they ask, together with their shepherds, for a universal council to resolve the problem.
78 Only councils and regular synods of all bishops could stop the abuses of the Curia and prevent scandals.
79
Moreover, Hontheim goes so far as to say that whoever defends the grievances brought about by Roman ultramontanists departs from the real will of Christ and therefore risks losing his eternal salvation!
80
Part 3 (chapters 7-9) can be regarded as a conclusion. It focuses on the liberty of the church (libertas ecclesiae). To regain it and to achieve a reunion between Catholics and Protestants, papal primacy has to be reduced to its Christ-given size.
81 Unfortunately, Hontheim does not explain how the reunion should come about. He seems to imply that Protestant Christians should revert to a reformed Catholic Church that is purged of the primacy ballast. Nevertheless, they would have to leave behind their theological axioms (sola gratia, sola fides, sola scriptura, etc.). This oversimplification of ecumenism shows -according to Harm Klueting -that Hontheim did not really envision a reunion.
82 On the contrary, he used the disguise of ecumenism for his own episcopalist agenda. How else could one explain the complete absence of any discussion of justification or sacramental theology?
83
Reaction and Retraction (1778)
The mass of pamphlets and books directed against De statu Ecclesiae challenged the author to respond. Already the second edition (Frankfurt, 1765) contained four appendixes.
84 Four volumes followed until 1774 (vols. 2-4). 85 However, not until 1778 did the influence of the nuncios Carprara, Bellisomi, Garampi, and the confessor Franz Beck bring Hontheim to "recant" his Febronius. 86 However, it was Guispee Garampi (1725-1791) who became the key figure of an anti-Febronian network between 1764 and 1776.
87
Since 1771 it had become more and more problematic for the aging auxiliary bishop to deny his authorship. When Franz Heinrich Beck was called as confessor to the court of Prince-bishop Clement Wenzeslaus (1768-1797), he immediately started to conspire against Hontheim. 88 He was successful in alienating the two bishops from each other. Nevertheless, Clement Wenzeslaus still maintained a certain appreciation for the old man. Also, the suppression of the Jesuits (1773) delayed actions against the author of the Febronius.
The newly elected Pope Pius VI (1775), however, was not willing to continue the more lenient policy of his predecessor. At the ordination ceremony of the new nuncio for Cologne on 24 September 1775, the pope was hard on German episcopalism. He complained about the "self-indulgent" innovators who wanted to overthrow the Apostolic foundation of the church, the papacy. He called this school of thought a contagious disease (contagio) which originated in Germany. 89 However, it was not only a case of the pope and the Archbishop of Trier increasing the pressure on Hontheim. A worldly motive also contributed to Hontheim's fall: the Curia promised Clement Wenzeslaus the abbey of Mettlach if he would silence Hontheim by appointing a coadjutor for him. On 2 March 1777 Johann Maria Herbain was in fact made coadjutor auxiliary bishop with the right to succeed Hontheim.
90
Any remaining sympathy for the old man was lost when Hontheim recommended on 6 November 1777 the contested book Neuer Versuch über die Weissagung von Emmanuel by Johann Lorenz Isenbiehl (1744-1818), a professor of exegesis and oriental languages. 91 Isenbiehl explained Isaiah 7:14 not as a foretelling of Christ's virginal conception but as a verse connected historically to Isaiah's time. 92 Since the exegete was already under suspicion (and was later censored), 93 Hontheim's support -let us not forget, he was a bishopcaused a scandal: Wenzeslaus urged him to make a clarification. He acceded in a document dated 9 April 1778. In it Hontheim declares that he embraces and supports every ecclesiastical judgment over Isenbiehl. However, he still charged the Curia with abuse of power and distinguished it from the "true" Apostolic See. 94 This was a fatal diplomatic mistake. Now the auxiliary bishop was even more vulnerable. The Trier elector Clement Wenzeslaus requested in a lengthy letter dated 21 April 1778 that Hontheim not only embrace all possible outcomes of the Isenbiehl trial but also retract his De statu Ecclesiae. The archbishop suggested that he should follow the example of Bishop Fenelon, who had recanted. Surprisingly, Hontheim immediately obeyed. Clement now sent him a list of sixteen curialist sentences, which a French theologian (perhaps Nicolas Bergier) had collected. These should be the basis for the retraction.
Had Hontheim really changed his mind? Not at all; he had only obeyed his superior. If one reads the manuscript Hontheim was working on during this year, this much becomes obvious: He planned a refutation of Thomas Maria Mamachi's (1713-1792) Epistula Justinum Febronium Ictum de ratione regendae Christianae Reipublicae deque legitima Romani Pontifics potestate (Rome, 1776). Only the proscription of the prince-elector stopped the project.
95
During the summer of 1778 the retraction was sent to Rome. Yet, in a letter from 22 August 1778, the papal court criticized some passages of Hontheim's text. He was asked to change them according to the attached annotations.
96
Moreover, he was to weave these changes into the text in such a way that every reader would assume that they were written by Hontheim himself. "It was the perfect instruction for play-acting. If the auxiliary would not accept everything from Rome and perhaps even more corrections he would not receive forgiveness."
97 The old auxiliary bishop only refused to implement the sentence that the papal government was rightly called monarchical (ut proinde merito monarchium Ecclesiae regimen a catholicis Doctoribus appelletur). 98 At least in one point he remained truthful.
99 The affair took the whole summer: First the prince-elector was dissatisfied with the text, then the Curia and so on. In November 1778 Hontheim's text was finally endorsed both by the Archbishop of Trier and the Curia. The final draft was in the form of a letter to the pope, dated 15 November 1778. 100 In it Hontheim admitted to and repented of his mistakes as well as surrendered himself to the Holy See.
101 However, the penitent had severe misgivings about the publication of his letter. Pius VI answered on 19 December, already delighted.
The author of the Febronius seemed surprised when journals and newspapers all over Europe reported that Pope Pius VI had presented his letter to the college of cardinals at their Christmas meeting in 1778. The Curia now "invited" the German bishops to congratulate the pope on his victory and thus indirectly to accept his jurisdictional claims. Hontheim's retraction was also considered politically valuable since the Curia thought it could be used against Josephinist canonists (e.g. Valentin Eybel, Paul Joseph von Riegger, and Stephan Rautenstrauch).
102
On 15 January 1779 Clement Wenzeslaus required Hontheim to prepare the publication of the Roman files regarding his retraction as well as the text of 97) Ibid., p. 127; cf. ibid., p. 131. 98) Ibid., p. 128. 99) Rechenmacher, Der Episkopalismus (see above, n. 10), p. 4. Hontheim rejected this term not because he denied an "imperium" within the Church but because for him "monarchia" was connected to the dangers of arbitrariness and despotism, cf. Janson, Das Kirchenverständnis (see above, n. 46), p. 200. his letter. Hontheim was shocked, since he believed that his submission would remain private; much later he told his biographer that he had made strict privacy a condition of his retraction. Hontheim's archbishop even pretended that he had not imagined that the pope would publicly announce the retraction letter. One cannot but feel sympathy for the old auxiliary bishop who tried to appease his superiors and was, as it seems, betrayed.
103 He played his part in the publication of the files and of his letter on 4 February 1779, probably too exhausted to fight his immediate superior in Trier and the Curia at the same time.
104 Nevertheless, Rome insisted that the deceived Hontheim stay in his office in order to keep the appearance of a completely settled strife.
105
For all supporters of the Josephinist ecclesiastical policy, e.g., Ignaz de Luca, the retraction was one of the most dangerous writings, "against the worldly regents."
106 The papal victory, however, was a small one, first of all because a number of German bishops and secular governments refused to allow the printing of the book (Austria, Spain, Milan, and Venice), 107 and secondly, because Hontheim's friends publicized the truth about the retraction, which the "penitent" had only signed and not -as the Curia claimed -authored. 109 In 1780 a choir of papers spread the news that the text of Hontheim's retraction had been forced. Hontheim was fully aware of this revelation and encouraged it. Archbishop Clement Wenzeslaus, however, requested a public statement in which Hontheim should tell the public the "truth." On 2 April 1780 he indeed published a letter that asserted that his retraction was voluntary. Yet, in his private correspondence, he admitted that he was moved by the immense pressure put on him to take this step. Even his close friend Krufft was disappointed -he thought the brave author of De statu Ecclesiae had become a frail geriatric.
110
At this point, Hontheim decided to comment on his retraction. The idea for this went back to the year 1778, when he had to implement the sixteen curialist theses in his letter to the pope.
111 At that time he did not have the energy for resistance. The legitimization for Hontheim's new work was the pope's reaction himself: he had asked the ailing auxiliary bishop to write an academic work that would defend the rights of the Holy See. That Hontheim's book, Commentarius in Suam Retractationem, which was published under the pseudonym Febronius in Frankfurt 1781, was quite the opposite is surprising. Finally, it seems, he had the courage to say what he thought.
In sentence seven Hontheim explains how the papal office unifies the church. However, he also remarks on the illegal papal "interferences" with diocesan jurisdiction, since he describes the bishops not only as successors of the Apostles but also as vicars of Christ -the latter being a title reserved for the Papacy alone! Even if Hontheim refused to acknowledge it, what jurisdiction he left to the Holy See gave him only the power of an honorary Primacy, which again is restricted by the General Council.
112
The State is given great influence (37th proposition): First, it can justly revoke all ecclesiastical privileges, second, every church authority needs the approval of the state to make proclamations regarding faith, sacraments, or discipline that could have an effect on the public life; thirdly, the state placeat implies the publication of dogmatic decisions and censorships.
113 What Hontheim embraces here is pure Gallicanism, thereby showing that he had never changed his mind. Febronius was still Febronius! 114 What then did he retract according to his "commentary"? Only the public call for resistance against Rome and the acrimony of his critique, not the basic ideas of his work. Simultaneously however, Hontheim assured the pope that his commentary was a defense of papal rights and that he never engaged in spreading rumors about the nature of his retraction. This was certainly the culmination of dishonesty. 126 Most contemporary reviewers thought that Hontheim's proposal for a reunion of the churches, which used ideas of Johann Gerhard and Georg Calixt, but asked for a conversio abberrantium, and a conversion of the Protestants to a Catholic Church purified from all medieval exaggerations of Papal Primacy, 127 was ridiculously naïve: 128 To the extent to which Febronianism reduced papal powers, it increased the power of the bishops, which was no less problematic for Protestants. 129 A reunion was only possible, stated Hontheim's opponents, Zaccaria as well as the Heidelberg professor Georg Sigismund Kleiner (1725-1786), 130 if the Protestant churches surrendered fully to the papal see. One can indeed speak of a "war of ecclesiologies": For Hontheim, all authority derives from service, which in itself is shaped by humility, exemplary charity, pastoral care, and great tolerance. For Zaccaria and Kleiner the church was a hierarchical society, built on the absolute, unquestionable power and authority of the pope. Unfortunately, nobody really engaged Hontheim's idea. The reaction was rather polemic and defamatory: The author of the Febronius could only be an apostate since his proposed reforms would cause the downfall of the Catholic Church.
131
Among Protestant academics, De statu Ecclesiae was reviewed positively, especially at the leading reform university in Göttingen, Germany. Friedrich Nicolai (1733-1811) 132 called the book a monument of "freedom of the mind" and as a Catholic approximation to the Reformation. The potential for ecumenical talks offered by Febronius, however, was viewed rather negatively: Carl Friedrich Bahrdt (1740-1792) 133 renounced it since Hontheim had taken neither the sola scriptura principle nor freedom of conscience into consideration. Christian Wilhelm Franz Walch (1726-1784) 134 and Johann Friedrich Wilhelm Jerusalem (1709-1789) thought similarly. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) went so far as to call it a "sassy flattery" of secular princes. 135 None of them had the impression that Hontheim understood the essentials of Protestant theology. In their eyes he downplayed the doctrinal differences and assessed them too much from the standpoint of governmental church politics.
136
Nevertheless, De statu Ecclesiae suggested a national church reform, recognized the necessity of ecumenism, rediscovered the sovereignty and liberty of the church as the people of God, and thus paved the way to the modern ecclesiologies of the twentieth century.
137
How the Febronius affected the German Church
The immediate effect of De statu Ecclesiae was an increase in the self-confidence of bishops. This led the Rhenish archbishops to the decrees of Koblenz (1769) and later to the decrees of the congress at Ems (1786) as well as to the synod of Pistoia (1786). Simultaneously Hontheim's ideas influenced the reforms of Joseph II in Austria. However, the Febronius did not accomplish its goalsbecause the book advocated a politically strong position for the Emperor which would equal that of the French king. After the Seven Years War (1763), however, the position of the Habsburg emperors was so weak that one could not expect from them the reconstruction of a German national church. Moreover, when Joseph II adopted Febronian ideas, he did this not to strengthen the position of the diocesan bishops but only to contribute to the centralization of the state. Strong and independent bishops were not part of his agenda.
138
It has not yet been investigated in depth what immediate influence the book had on the European movement of Febronianism, which taught the basic theses of Hontheim in combination with Jansenist or Enlightenment ideas and produced a radical episcopalism.
139 Pope Clement XIII (1758-1769) of course called the book a danger for all Catholics since it would make them insecure about the foundation of the church. Febronius abbreviatus (see above, n. 42), ch. 7, §1: "Ecclesia usque ad Constantinum M. gemebat sub gravi servituti ethnicorum principum. Eadem post aliquot saeculorum decursum novam servitutem subiit ab iis, a quibus omne praesidium ex quo circa saeculum X. obstetricante ignorantia parta fuit, tantum non in dies incrementa cepit usque ad Constantiensem et Basiliensem synodum, a quibus aliquot lenimen accipere visa est." Klueting also thinks that the main goal of De statu Ecclesiae was not ecumenism but the strengthening of episcopalism, see Klueting, 'Wiedervereinigung' (see above, n. 1), 276-277. 138) Schneider, Der Konziliarismus (see above, n. 4), p. 78. 139) Pitzer, Justinus Febronius (see above, n. 16), p. 114.
140) Briefwechsel zwischen weiland Ihrer Durchlaucht Dem Herrn Kurfürsten von Trier Clemens
In the German church one can detect a reserved stance toward papal claims of jurisdiction up to the eve of Vatican I (1870). Episcopalism and Josephinism were also still very much alive at the Frankfurt Conferences of 1818.
141 Nevertheless, the basis for the movement of Febronianism disappeared gradually in the nineteenth century since the papacy knew how to make use of the sufferings it had endured during Napoleon's reign. After the end of the Reichskirche, the popes became the unchallenged moral leaders of Catholicism. From here it was only a small step to the uniform common identity within Catholicism (1846-1958), which hardly ever challenged the infallibility of the popes.
142
Critical Résumé
The eminent German canon law historian Georg May has recently pointed out the weaknesses of De statu Ecclesiae: It is a work ignorant of historical developments which sees the papal monarchy solely based on the Pseudoisidorian Decretals, a ninth-century forgery. However, these originated not in Rome, but in France. May rightly argues that the Decretals do not directly strengthen the primacy of the pope but are rather ambiguous. They can be used either for an episcopalist or a papalist argument. "The idea of an ecclesiastical constitution, which adjudged the Roman Church a normative position, came into existence independent from the Pseudoisidorian Decretals." 143 The Decretals were thus not the basis for the primacy but a symptom for its increase in authority. Even though, as May correctly remarks, Hontheim never combined the democratic and the aristocratic part of his ecclesiology, and also committed other sins of inconsistency, 144 one cannot but admit that De statu Ecclesiae brought up an
